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The discussions and findings of the 2012 NACIS Conference Aesthetics of Mapping 
sessions both turned and stumbled upon the definition of terms like aesthetics, clarity, and 
style. This paper attempts to situate these key concepts, along with others such as design, 
taste, and mapicity, in a broad and flexible theoretical framework that will facilitate a 
useful and applicable understanding. A structure is proposed wherein a map, a rhetorical 
object which exists under the aegis of mapicity (which is that quality of map-ness that 
makes a map a map), is brought into being through an aesthetic act of design. Design, 
which has both theoretical and craft aspects, governs the form of the artifact through 
adherence to conventional practices identifiable as styles. The balance between the choices 
available is a matter of taste, wherein the schema of mapicity is manifested judgmentally. 
Clarity, currently seen as a desirable attribute, is one of a range of aesthetic attributes 
contingently defined by the cultural interpretive community that provides the schema of 
mapicity.
A E S T H E T I C S
The large participation in the Aesthetics of Mapping sessions at the 2012 NACIS 
Conference in Portland, Oregon, was gratifying and encouraging, but, at the same 
time, the general trend of the discussion was, in some ways, a bit of a curate’s egg. 
As a theme for the conference, the focus on aesthetics followed naturally upon 
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the 2011 conference theme of the importance of design, and it is very good to see 
these important issues take a front seat in the attentions of the cartographic com-
munity. Aesthetics is a broad term for concepts pervasive in our lives and behavior; 
aesthetics even intrude, as Leonard Koren has pointed out, “into what we believe 
are the domains of reason. We often rely on aesthetic cues to determine wheth-
er the information we receive from others is true, false, or in-between” (Koren 
2010). It became clear quite early on in the Aesthetics of Mapping presentations and 
general discussion, however, that there was a good deal of confusion about how the 
concept of cartographic aesthetics was to be engaged, and its place in education 
and practice.
Significantly, the discussion in Portland (in both of the general sessions and in 
the smaller working group session the next day) tended to appose the concept of 
aesthetics to one of clarity. In fact, there was a widely held consensus that ascribed 
the quality of beauty to be a product of clarity, and to suspect an indulgence in 
aesthetics of tending to erode both beauty and clarity. Clearly, the long established 
popular antipathy between the self-image of the “serious” cartographer and perva-
sive cultural attitudes toward aesthetic concerns is alive and well. These attitudes 
are rooted (consciously or not) in both Schopenhauer’s view of aesthetics as a 
non-practical state of contemplation (Schopenhauer 1966) and in the Expression 
theory of art wherein aesthetic concerns are manifestations of emotion (Dickie 
1997). Either view is predictably unattractive to any map maker with a positivist, 
“serious,” self image. Obviously, the supposed dichotomy between aesthetic and 
so-called “serious” concerns needs to be critically examined and debunked before a 
useful understanding of cartographic aesthetics can be reached.
C L A R I T Y
Clarity was discussed by many in Portland as if it was an absolute commodity 
that was essential to a map’s value as a map. The consensus seemed to be that one 
should start with a clear map, to which one could carefully add “aesthetics” with 
fine discretion, taking care that the sacred clarity not be impinged. Although there 
was a broad agreement that clarity comes, in some undefined manner, through 
simplification and/or abstraction, in general clarity seemed to be thought of as 
some sort of state of grace. There was a great deal of resistance to the suggestion 
that clarity is itself an aesthetic dimension, and a cultural convention that may or 
may not be defined consistently across cultures or across time. This is to say that 
what might constitute cartographic clarity for one group of map readers (in time 
or cultural space) may very well not constitute clarity for another. Clarity, in this 
regard, is like realism: each is defined by culturally determined conventions that are 
variable. There is little reason to think that the famously realistic grapes of Zeuxis 
or curtain of Parrhasius (Pliny 77) would fool anyone today, and it is reasonable 
to expect that future generations will find images that we consider faithful repro-
ductions of reality to be as artificial as we see ancient Egyptian figure painting 
(Gombrich 1960). This is not, however, because of any superior sophistication in 
ourselves over our ancestors, or any inferiority of our perception to that of our de-
scendants, but simply that our and their criteria for defining realism and/or clarity 
are just rather different. 
Aesthetics is a broad 
term for concepts 
pervasive in our lives
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For an example of this, we could consider the case of blackletter type (often 
misnamed Olde English in the US). “The first types cut in Europe, including all 
of Gutenberg’s, were blackletters,” and use of the form was widespread. “Scripts 
and printing types of this kind were once used throughout Europe—in England, 
France, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, the Netherlands, and Spain, as well as in 
Germany—and some species even thrived in Italy” (Bringhurst 2002, 250). This 
letterform could only have flourished so pervasively, and over such a considerable 
period of time (from the 10th century to well into the 17th, and in some cases into 
the 20th), because it was considered clear and readable by its audience: it afforded 
clarity. That blackletter is no longer considered clear, and is instead often denigrat-
ed as an obfuscated affectation, has no bearing on its earlier status as clear. Similar-
ly, that some antique maps may sometimes seem crabbed, obscure, obfuscated, or 
even just quaint, to a reader today has no bearing on their clarity to their targeted 
audience, and any inclination to broadly dismiss such maps as, for example, being 
over-decorated to mask an underlying unsophistication, is profoundly naïve. 
A good many participants at the Aesthetics of Mapping sessions professed the opin-
ion that clarity was achieved through simplification and/or abstraction. If so, then, 
logically, this would mean that the most clear map graphic would be a single mark 
on an otherwise blank sheet of paper. It would seem unlikely, however, that such a 
“map” would have been accepted by any of the session participants as a paradigm 
of clarity. There must, therefore, be some sort of qualification, some sort of limit, to 
simplification and abstraction that allows achievement of clarity. Perhaps it is only 
certain types of simplification and abstraction, or only certain ways of carrying it 
out, that result in clarity. This is certainly the case; the conventions of cartographic 
generalization provide qualifications and limits to practice, and the limits are as 
conventional as the generalization conventions themselves.
Clarity, it is clear, is as much a product of a conventional code as any other aspect 
of the map, and must be understood as an aesthetic element. As such, clarity is 
defined contingently, as a part of the overall definition of what makes an artifact a 
map, and of what makes a map a good map.
M A P I C I T Y  A N D  D E S I G N
Maps are artifacts, first and foremost, before they ever become maps. A map is an 
artifact with particular formal attributes, and that artifact mediates a process of 
social communication. Map form is critically important, because it is the formal 
aspects of the map that allow it, first, to be recognized as a map, and then to go 
on to sustain a reading as a map. Without recognition, something can never be a 
map, whatever the intention of the map maker, and without an ability to sustain 
a (post-recognition) map reading engagement, a map will be dismissed: not used, 
not read, not considered. If that happens, the artifact will have failed as a map. 
The designed form of the map mediates between the map maker and map user, 
and is the sole means the maker has of signaling to the potential user that the 
artifact is a map. It is the map user who must recognize an artifact’s potential to be 
a map, and it is the design of the artifact that allows the map to be recognizable. 
Clarity, it is clear, is as 
much a product of a 
conventional code as any 
other aspect of the map, 
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No one can recognize a map, or set out to make one, without knowing how to tell 
a thing-that-is-a-map from a thing-that-is-not. We recognize maps, and distin-
guish them from all other things, because they conform to a schema of map-ness 
that we receive from our cultural communities. This schema, which includes a 
paradigmatic vocabulary of appropriate form, a grammatical syntax of application, 
and a canon of exemplars, is how we recognize suitable candidates for map-ness. 
Conformation to that schema constitutes mapicity, which is the quality a map 
reader recognizes in the artifact as constituting the condition of being a map 
(Denil 2011). Recognition of mapicity relies on formal attributes, and design is the 
means the map maker has of manifesting it in a manner accessible to a potential 
reader.
Maps can only exist inside strictly defined, albeit mutable, formal boundaries, and 
outside the boundaries of the schema of mapicity lies the not-map. We read and 
understand only that which we recognize as readable and understandable, based on 
criteria we receive from and share with our fellows. Ludwig Wittgenstein noted 
that: “If a lion could talk, we could not understand him.” (Wittgenstein 1958, 
223e), and similarly, if a lion drew maps, we would not know them to be maps. 
This is because we have no community of culture with the lion, and should lions 
have a schema of mapicity, we would have no access to it.
There is a certain hegemony in the operation of all schemas of understanding, 
similar to that Max Beerbohm noted exists in regard to dandy-ism: a dandy must 
be innovative, but can be so only within strict limits.
“It is only by the trifling addition or elimination, modification 
or extension, made by this or that dandy and copied by the rest, 
that the mode proceeds. The young dandy will find certain laws 
to which he must conform. If he outrages them he will be hooted 
by the urchins of the street, not unjustly, for he will have outraged 
the slowly constructed laws of artists who have preceded him.” 
( Beerbohm 1962, 1896)
Similarly, a map that departs from the accepted schema of mapicity will have a 
hard time even being recognized as a map, and will at best incur extreme prejudice 
against its validity, veracity, and value. “Common sense” (which is simply an appli-
cation of the dictates of the schema) will speak against the map’s acceptance.
The mapicity schema provides us with criteria for judging not only the existence of 
the map object, but also for judging its quality, and it does so, as has been men-
tioned, through both a conceptual framework and a canon of exemplars of quality. 
The canon provides a library of models for what constitutes good practice (exam-
ples “their shipmates would do well to emulate,” as enlisted sailors are exhorted in 
the US Navy), against which all maps are judged. Truly, Heinrich Wölfflin’s remark 
that all paintings owe more to other paintings than they owe to direct observation 
(Wölfflin 1932; Gombrich 1969) can also be applied to maps. In short: we can 
recognize a good map because we have seen good maps before. 
If a lion drew maps, 
we would not know 
them to be maps.
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Thus, the schema both facilitates and constrains the form of the artifact, and the 
stricture of that schema both defines the boundaries of mapicity and gives mean-
ing (and a means of reading that meaning) to the artifacts which lie within the 
pale. Boundaries fence both in and out, and, as Mozart is reported to have re-
marked, “we would not be creative if we did not have all these boundaries.”
M A P I C I T Y  T H E O R Y
The existence and operation of schemas of mapicity, defining the very existence of 
a category of things-that-are-maps, is an extension of the broadly recognized way 
that such schemas of understanding govern many aspects of culture, notably in 
regard to our ability to recognize and read graphic images (Gombrich 1960), and 
it is consistent with a great deal of recent thinking in a variety of theoretical fields. 
Particularly, the theory of mapicity can be compared to what is known as the In-
stitutional Theory of Art, wherein “works of art are art as the result of the position 
or place they occupy within an established practice, namely, the artworld” (Dickie 
1997, 88; Danto 1997). Mapicity theory is also strongly grounded in linguistic 
theory, in particular the Reader Response theories of Stanley Fish (1980), and in 
the work of many others, such as Roland Barthes (1972). By contrast, although 
some aspects of the functioning of the mapicity canon might be modeled using the 
example of prototype theory, which is a mode of graded categorization sometimes 
used in cognitive science, prototype theory is likely not a good overall explanation 
for mapicity. While it may help explain how one map might be seen as a “better” 
model than another, prototyping also tends to imply that some maps are more 
map-ish than others, and so tends to run straight into the dead end of mistaking 
taxonomy for definition.
The theory of mapicity has been criticized for a certain circularity of causation; 
to wit: a map is a map because we recognize it as conforming to the schema of 
mapicity, and mapicity is the schema of things-that-are-maps. While a chain of 
definition should ideally lead only to more and more basic terms, and  circularity 
is commonly seen as an argumentative fallacy, it should be recognized that where 
the phenomenon itself,—in this case the existence, creation, recognition, and use 
of things-that-are-maps—is  intricate, interdependent, and co-relational, then the 
terms of the definition must be inflected and presuppose each other. Thus, the per-
ceived circularity is not vicious. We must keep in mind that cartography is not an 
essential activity: there is no essential category of things that are maps, that always 
were maps, and will always be maps. Cartography is instead a body of conventions 
to which communities of humans subscribe, and the map is an artifact that meets 
the criteria set forth in that body of conventions. Regardless of any hypothesized 
or fantasized human predilection or predisposition to map making, cartography is 
only a conventional practice producing conventionalized artifacts to the parame-
ters defined in a cultural convention. Nowhere does the cycle rest on any essential 
bedrock. Instead, like Baron Munchausen (Raspe et al. 1960), cartography pulls it-
self up by its own bootstraps, and it has kept itself in the air for thousands of years 
by that means alone: by means of that common agreement we are calling mapicity.
Cartography pulls itself 
up by its own bootstraps, 
and it has kept itself in the 
air for thousands of years 
by that means alone.
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T H E  A C T  O F  D E S I G N
The map artifact is composed in conformity with a schema of mapicity, and the 
artifact itself is formed through a process or act of design. 
Alex White points out that “having material on the page read and absorbed is a 
visual communicator’s chief responsibility” (White 2002, 1), and that design is a 
process, not a result. He goes on to remind us that to design means to plan, and 
that “the process of design is used to bring order out of chaos and randomness” 
(White 2002, 1). Furthermore, as Randy Nakamura noted, “design is about analy-
sis and problem-solving, [but] its fundamental impact on the world (for better or 
for worse) is in the artifacts and form it produces” (Nakamura 2004, 49). 
Design, the means used to bring the map artifact into existence, involves an 
intersection of theoretical and craft knowledge. Theory tells us what a map is and 
should be (mapicity); what a meaning bearing graphic text is and can be; and what 
a persuasive argument is and must be. Craft, on the other hand, gives us a mastery 
of means and a culture of materials, and among the means are the so-called carto-
graphic fundamentals in which aspiring map makers have long been drilled. It is 
within a framework of theory that tacit craft knowledge is applied.
Theory and craft are not a dichotomy; neither can exist independently, and one 
side of the pair cannot be privileged over the other. Theory requires craft for 
embodiment, and even a state of pure virtuoso craftsmanship requires a belief (a 
theory) that virtuosity is by itself sufficient. 
S T Y L E 
The particular schematic elements, graphic practices, and rhetorical tropes and 
figures that a particular interpretive community has come to identify as correct and 
appropriate (come, that is, to recognize as constituting good, effective, acceptable, 
clear, fine, or even barely credible, map making), are not entirely autonomous and 
independent. One does not generally pick and choose “one from column A and 
two from column B,” as if in a Chinese restaurant. The individual elements are 
instead bundled together in sets that are deemed to constitute frameworks of ap-
propriate application; sets of elements, practices, and features that are conjectured 
to work well together. These frameworks of “correct” practice are called styles.
If asked, most people would likely say that style is something added to a work or 
object; something tacked-on or applied like paint or wallpaper. Walt Whitman, 
writing in his introduction to Leaves of Grass, saw style as a curtain: something that 
covers what lies beneath, and that hides what is “really there.” 
“The greatest poet has less a marked style and is more the channel 
of thoughts and things without increase or diminution, and is the 
free channel of himself. He swears to his art, I will not be meddle-
some, will not have in my writing any elegance or effect or origi-
nality to hang in the way between me and the rest like curtains. I 
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will have nothing hang in the way, not the richest curtains. What 
I tell I tell for precisely what it is.” (Whitman 1855, vii)
Many would agree with Whitman’s view, but his definition rather confuses sub-
stance with decoration. The curtain metaphor implies that the curtain could be 
parted, or made transparent, and that something deeper would in that way be re-
vealed (Sontag 1969). Denis Wood (2007) makes a similar mistake in writing that 
the mask of the map could somehow be removed, or, as in his so-called “art map,” 
never donned in the first place—but such an unmasking is clearly impossible. 
It is impossible because, as Susan Sontag wrote, “Even if one were to define style 
as the manner of our appearing, this by no means entails an opposition between a 
style that one assumes and one’s “true” being. In fact, such a disjunction is extreme-
ly rare. In almost every case, our manner of appearing is our manner of being. The 
mask is the face.” (Sontag 1969, 26).
Whitman’s curtain metaphor lends itself to ideas of style as having thickness and 
opacity, and implies that there can be quantities of style; more style or less style, or 
perhaps even no style at all. This conception is rooted in the idea that style some-
how covers or hides what is really there, and that style can only obscure something 
deeper. Sontag refuted that, noting that “the notion of a style-less, transparent art 
is one of the most tenacious fantasies of modern culture” (Sontag 1969, 25), and 
went on to observe that “the antipathy to ‘style’ is always an antipathy to a given 
style. There are no style-less works of art, only works of art belonging to different, 
more or less complex stylistic traditions and conventions” (Sontag 1969, 27). There 
is not, and cannot be, a neutral, absolutely transparent style. Even a so called “non-
style” is a style, and is simply another set of conventions. 
The writers Albert Camus (Camus 1955), Ernest Hemingway (Hemingway 1949), 
Roland Barthes (Barthes 1968), and George Orwell (Orwell 1958) had all, in their 
day, been hailed for dispensing altogether with style and instead presenting bald, 
unadorned prose devoid of all artifice. Nonetheless, as Sontag observed, neither the 
“white style” of a Camus novel, nor the “zero degree of writing” of Roland Barthes, 
is any less selective and artificial than any other style of writing (Sontag 1969). 
Style, then, is not a curtain or mask, but is instead a collection of elements and 
characteristics enshrined in the schema as effective and appropriate for employ-
ment, and that are recognizable as “consistent” and “right” by someone versed in 
the schema. Leonard Koren wrote that “a style […] is a conglomeration of percep-
tible elements recognizable as a distinct variety of order. In other words, a style is a 
perceptually cohesive organization of qualities […] that is distinct from other per-
ceptually cohesive organizations of qualities” (Koren 2010, 21). These organizations 
of qualities are simply patterns of practice, and form the paradigmatic frameworks 
that are extracted from the mapicity schema’s vocabulary, grammar, and canon as 
prototypes for both designing and judging maps. 
No map anyone can make is ever anything except a selective application of con-
ventional codes, and the codes are definable and classifiable stylistically. Anyone 
who attempts to actually make a map without any style may succeed in making 
Anyone who attempts 
to actually make a map 
without any style may 
succeed in making 
something, but that thing 
will not be a map.
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something, but that thing will not be a map. Maps only exist by conformation to a 
schema of mapicity, and style is just a set of characteristics enshrined in the sche-
ma as effective and appropriate for employment.
To centralize style in this manner—that is, to maintain that there can be no map 
devoid of style—is not to allow the definition of the map to be infiltrated by 
stylistic characteristics (which would be to mistake taxonomy for definition). This 
is to say that the kinds of map (topographic, thematic, sketch, plan, diagram) play 
no part in defining the map, but only in describing a particular map. The map, as a 
thing, must ultimately be understood as “the projection and materialization of a 
mental schema on a medium. The materialization of an abstract intellectual order 
extracted from the empirical universe” ( Jacob 2006), and as a rhetorical object that 
must be “useful, usable, and persuasive” to its audience (Denil 2002). As a rhetor-
ical object, the map clearly has no special subject matter (it can be about almost 
anything), and it has no special or specific means of presentation and persuasion (it 
can use any means at its disposal). Obviously, as a rhetorical vehicle, it will employ 
means that are amenable to its target audience: it will make use of tropes and fig-
ures that will persuade that community. The architecture of that body of means is 
encapsulated in the schema of mapicity for that community, and can be described 
by reference to stylistic definition: the map itself is an artificial architecture of 
signs ruled by graphic choices ( Jacob 2006), and the sets of appropriate choices are 
gathered into styles.
Style, we see, has a clear role in describing the map, but not in defining it. Of 
course, for many people, defining and describing is the same thing. 
A  PA R A B L E  A B O U T  D E F I N I T I O N 
V E R S U S  D E S C R I P T I O N
Since 2007, the Cartography Special Interest Group (CartoSIG) for Esri software 
users has appointed a panel of map judges to select winners of CartoSIG Map 
Awards at the annual Esri International User Conference. In 2012 a very inter-
esting map was nominated: it was a street furniture map of the City of Carson, 
California, that was composed by an unnamed map maker using the tool that 
the maker had at hand and knew how to use, which happened in this case to be 
Microsoft Excel. The map was a remarkable production: clear, easy to read and 
understand, full of useful and usable information, and persuasive of its value and 
reliability. The CartoSIG nominator argued that this, perhaps unorthodox, map 
deserved the attention of the judges and, quite possibly, an award. However, the 
majority of the judges on the panel thought otherwise, and some were, in fact, 
openly affronted by the suggestion. “That is not a map!”, and “That is only a dia-
gram!” were typical comments in the debate. Regardless of the merits or otherwise 
of the map in question, the vehemence of the resistance to even considering the 
artifact as a map, let alone as a good map, demonstrates both the operation of the 
schema and a naive interpenetration of that schema that mistakes taxonomy for 
definition. For the majority of the judges, the artifact was squarely beyond the not-
a-map pale, and they made it clear that their placing it there was grounded not 
in a evaluation of its value as a map (to wit: is it useful, usable, and persuasive as a 
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map?), but on the fact that it didn’t look like (that it did not stylistically match), 
what it is they are expecting maps to look like. The consequence of employing this 
narrow viewpoint is that the artifact in question (and, by extension, a large class of 
other such artifacts)—which in fact meets all practical and logical criteria for being 
a map; that answers a need for a map, that can be used as a map, that is persuasive 
of its veracity as a map, and that is in fact (apparently) employed by some people 
as a map—is, somehow, and somewhat irrationally, not a map! It is as if it had been 
born on the wrong side of the tracks, and so must be cut by polite society.
This story leads us to consider how judgments about maps (such as map/not-map? 
or good/bad/indifferent map?) are made. The schema supplies us guidelines, rules, 
and a canon of samples, but how are these overlapping and sometimes contradic-
tory instructions to be applied? The decisions are made by employing taste.
TA S T E
We can recall that the outward signs of mapicity are manifested through design, 
a process which determines the form of the artifact, and we can recall as well that 
design itself incorporates both theoretical and craft aspects that co-exist in a sym-
biotic relationship. We have also seen how sets of graphic and structural choices 
appropriate to audiences holding particular schemas of mapicity are recogniz-
able as styles. Taste provides the balance between theory and craft, and between 
competing factors within each of them, and also provides the facility for navigating 
between, and negotiating amongst, the dictates of style. While style manifests the 
schema as sets of appropriate choices, taste is the schema’s judgmental manifesta-
tion that allows choices to be made. 
The operation of taste came to prominence in eighteenth century philosophy, 
in the work of such writers as the 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Shaftesbury, 1737), 
Francis Hutcheson (1725), Edmund Burke (1770), Archibald Alison (1790) and 
Immanuel Kant (1790). In subsequent years, however, focus for most thinkers 
moved on to center on theories of aesthetics and of art (Dickie 1997). Thus, taste 
gradually became a side issue in wider discussions, less attended and less clearly 
understood.
Despite the fact that “the idea of taste is problematic and widely contested today” 
(Keedy 2004, 97), it still provides us with “the ability to perceive and distinguish—
to recognize and identify—artistic and stylistic features of things, and then to use 
this ability to make judgments of value based on cultural or professional criteria” 
(Koren 2010, 22).
Taste, we see, is an ability to balance and prioritize amongst the dictates of style, 
the facilitations and constraints of craft based technique and the culture of ma-
terials, and between the arbitrary demands of clients, the perceived needs of the 
targeted audience, and the hegemony of the schema of mapicity itself. Ultimately, 
experience is needed in order to establish criteria for balancing and prioritizing 
amongst seemingly contradictory demands and needs and conventions and rules. 
It is difficult, but, as the designer Jeff (Mr.) Keedy said: “that’s why you ask an ex-
While style manifests 
the schema as sets of 
appropriate choices, taste 
is the schema’s judgmental 
manifestation that allows 
choices to be made. 
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pert—you know, someone who actually knows what they are talking about” (Keedy 
2004, 97).
The skilled cartographer, the expert, the one who actually knows what they are 
talking about, sees the cartographic challenge from inside the context of the sche-
ma of mapicity, and tastefully navigates amongst applicable stylistic convention to 
compose the useful, usable and persuasive map. In a similar manner: 
“a client coming to a lawyer tells a story that in his mind has obvi-
ous critical features and decisive moments; but when the lawyer 
hears that story, she hears it quite differently and with different 
emphasis. What may appear most significant to the client may 
drop out altogether in her consideration of the matter. What she 
has been doing is translating (or transubstantiating) what was 
told her into appropriate legal categories; that is, into the catego-
ries from which a legal case might be assembled.” (Fish 1995, 71)
There are some who maintain that this process is a distortion of reality by the 
special vocabulary of a mere discipline (whether of law or cartography), and see 
this as a cautionary tale as to why one should not put oneself into the hands of 
lawyers, or of cartographers. Such people believe that if one could only get rid of 
the machinery of cartographic culture, with its terms, conventions, standard map 
furniture, neat lines, and whatnot, then everyone would be closer to seeing what is 
really going on. We could then grab the map by the scruff and rip away its mask, 
allowing us to march naked truth up the street for all to ogle and to paw.
But such stripping is simply not possible. If we really ripped away the mask, we 
would no longer recognize what we held. This is because the map exists as the 
mask, not as something lurking under it. This is not to say that the mask is im-
mutable; the mask is the schema of mapicity and that schema evolves and mutates 
over time. It is also important to note that the mask worn by the map is not nec-
essarily the mask intended by the map’s maker: it is the reader who supplies and 
imposes the mask. If the reader so chooses, a subversive mask can be imposed, as 
Denis Wood (1992) has shown, although Wood himself might not express it that 
way. It would even be possible to dramatically remake the schema itself, and Mark 
Denil (2011) has outlined what would be required to do that in a radical fashion. 
Such re-makings, however, must then perforce be reabsorbed into the schema 
because once we have seen and recognized a radical map, it is then, by definition, a 
map, and thus a part of the schema.
The schema functions this way because cartography is a conventional activity, not 
an essential one. In other words, the cartographic activity is not an activity with 
an essential existence in and of itself, but is instead defined by sets of conventions. 
No one discovered cartography (it was not sitting there waiting to be noticed); but 
someone had to invent the conventions of cartography, and every map maker and 
reader has had to learn them.
If we really ripped away the 
mask, we would no longer 
recognize what we held. 
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A C Q U I R I N G  TA S T E
If taste is so important, how does one go about acquiring it? How can one learn 
to tell if he is a tuna with good taste or just a tuna that tastes good? The answer is 
that taste, like the schema itself, is passed to us.
Turning back to our law office example, the lawyer is applying what we could call 
her “legal taste” in navigating the structures and strictures of the legal schema. 
The client has come to consult her because he believes she can do this. She may, 
in turn, have a mentor to whom she can turn for advice. No doubt the mentor 
would not build her case for her, but may be willing to critique her brief: to point 
out what may or may not fly in the courtroom she is entering, and to steer her in 
directions the mentor’s experience might suggest. Taste is not developed in a vacu-
um; it is passed through critique.
Critique is too large a topic to tackle in this paper, but it is clearly pivotal to de-
veloping taste, just as taste is critical to employing style. The topic of critique was 
bandied about in the Aesthetics sessions, and Nat Case specifically spoke about it 
at length in a separate NACIS session later that same day, but it seems clear that 
critique is little understood and cultivated in the cartographic community.
At one point in the general discussion, a well known professor from a large, 
north-eastern university quoted a colleague of hers to the effect that “we should not 
solicit the opinions of students; we should supply them with opinions.” While succinct 
and pithy, this glib statement is, however, only true in a very limited sense, and 
only insofar as it pertains to the most elementary levels of education. Yes, a basic 
education must supply a pupil with a clear understanding of the mapicity sche-
ma: the student must be drilled in the common understanding so that it solidly 
underpins their reading and composition. At that level, cartographic education is 
essentially craft instruction. At more advanced levels, however, such a professorial 
attitude is a positive disservice to both the student and to the cultural community. 
Of course a student’s opinion must be solicited: it must be solicited and dissected 
and examined and discussed; it must be paraded and made to dance and itself be 
constructively criticized. It must be solicited, that is, if the teacher ever hopes to 
impart or implant discerned judgment (which we call taste) in the student. One 
raison d’être of critique is the building of taste, and, clearly, one person cannot just 
hand taste to another, or drill it into them with instruction; taste can only be fos-
tered and cultivated so as to grow itself and bear its own fruit.
S U M M A R Y
Together, style and taste are key elements in the composition of useful, usable, and 
persuasive maps. All maps, from the simplest and most naive or primitive to the 
most elaborate and complex, exhibit style, and a style is a set of appropriate choices 
afforded by the schema of mapicity. However, while style can assist in the imple-
mentation of good cartographic decisions, it cannot by itself direct the map maker 
to make good decisions. This is the role of taste, which is the ability to perceive and 
distinguish stylistic features and aesthetic dimensions, and then to use this ability 
to make value judgments based on cultural or professional criteria, which is to say, 
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on the schema of mapicity. Taste develops with cultivated experience, and must be 
cultivated to be valuable. A naïve, serendipitous, “good taste” is possible, but such a 
taste is, at best, limited. Experience throughout history has taught us that the best 
vehicle for cultivating and refining taste is through engaged critique with experi-
enced mentors. A basic educational groundwork upon which to build this super-
structure of taste is required, but that basic education is unfinished if it is not used 
as a plinth for underpinning taste.
C O N C L U S I O N
The theoretical, practical, and canonical elements of cartographic mapicity are 
made available by the cultural interpretive community to which the individual 
map maker or map reader belongs. Mapicity is manifested in artifacts composed 
through aesthetic acts of design, and the formal aspects of the map artifact are 
parametrized in styles. These styles are navigated by means of discerned judgment 
guided by taste, which is fostered in an individual maker or reader through basic 
instruction (including craft instruction) and advanced, critique-based experience 
afforded by mentors who are themselves facile with the tasteful application of par-
adigms and exemplars afforded by the vocabulary, grammar and canon of mapicity. 
The convergence of style and taste leverages a particular map into the canon, where 
it serves as an aesthetic benchmark and expands and refines the horizon of mapici-
ty for the wider interpretive community.
S O M E  C L O S I N G  R E M A R K S  O N  T H E  2 0 1 2  N A C I S 
A E S T H E T I C S  S E S S I O N S .
The difficulty the cartographic community exhibits in engaging with aesthetic is-
sues, including design, style, taste, and critique, seems to lie in a certain poverty of 
vocabulary and grammar for addressing aesthetic concerns. This poverty may well 
spring from the uneasy relationship many in the community have with accepting 
the pertinent and essential nature of aesthetics in cartography; but, regardless of 
the cause, it is a lack that can only be overcome by vigorous and persistent critical 
exercise with knowledgeable and open minded colleagues. Let us hope the 2012 
NACIS Aesthetics of Mapping sessions are only a beginning that foretells a deeper 
engagement and understanding that is to come.
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